Few conflicts are described in such irreconcilable language as the war in Gaza. The same events are recounted as self-defence by one party and as grave breaches of the law by another. This article does not attempt to settle those disputes. Its purpose is narrower and, we hope, more useful: to explain the legal vocabulary the world is using — what the key terms actually mean, which institutions are seized of the questions, and what those institutions can and cannot do. It is an explainer of the law, not a verdict on the facts.
International law does not speak with a single voice on a conflict of this intensity, and reasonable lawyers disagree sharply about how its rules apply to contested facts. What follows therefore sets out the principles, the institutions and the open questions, attributing contested claims to the party making them. Where the facts themselves are disputed — casualty figures, the conduct of particular operations, the intent behind them — we flag the dispute rather than resolve it.
Reported figures from the conflict are themselves contested and are compiled by different bodies using different methodologies; readers should treat all such numbers as estimates subject to revision. Our aim is to give the reader a framework for understanding the legal argument, whoever they ultimately find more persuasive.
The principles of humanitarian law
International humanitarian law (IHL) — the body of rules also known as the law of armed conflict, drawn principally from the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols and from customary law — applies once an armed conflict exists, regardless of who started it or why. It binds all parties, state and non-state alike, and several of its core rules sit at the heart of the present debate.
The principle of distinction requires parties to direct attacks only at combatants and military objectives, never at civilians or civilian objects as such. The principle of proportionality prohibits an attack expected to cause civilian harm that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The obligation to take precautions in attack requires feasible steps to verify targets and minimise civilian harm. Distinct again is the prohibition on collective punishment — penalising a population for acts it did not commit — and the rules requiring parties to allow and facilitate humanitarian access for civilians in need.
Under international humanitarian law, the parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants, and may direct their operations only against military objectives.
These principles are easy to state and notoriously difficult to apply. Critics of Israel's conduct argue that the scale of civilian casualties and destruction, and restrictions on aid, point to violations of proportionality, precautions and the prohibition on collective punishment. The Israeli government maintains that it directs its operations at Hamas military objectives, that it takes extensive precautions including warnings to civilians, and that civilian harm is the result of Hamas embedding fighters and infrastructure within civilian areas — itself a violation of IHL, it says, attributable to Hamas. Many international lawyers contend that proportionality must be assessed attack-by-attack on the available evidence rather than inferred from aggregate figures; others argue that a pattern of harm can itself be probative. The disagreement is genuine, and it turns largely on facts that are disputed.
Occupation and the status of the territory
A second cluster of questions concerns the law of belligerent occupation, governed chiefly by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention. The law of occupation imposes duties on an occupying power toward the population of the territory it controls, including ensuring public order and welfare, and it restricts certain measures such as the transfer of the occupier's own population into occupied territory.
Whether and to what extent these rules apply to Gaza and the West Bank is itself contested. Much of the international community, and a 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, treat the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza as occupied territory and regard Israeli settlement activity as inconsistent with international law. The Israeli government has long disputed key aspects of that characterisation — arguing, among other things, that the territories' status is sui generis and a matter for negotiation, and at points that it ceased to occupy Gaza after its 2005 withdrawal. Critics respond that effective control, not physical presence, is the legal test, and that the question of control during active hostilities is contested on the facts.
The status of the territory is not an academic point. It shapes which body of law governs day-to-day administration, the legality of settlements, the duties owed to civilians, and the framing of a future political settlement. It is also one of the most heavily litigated questions in the entire dispute, and one on which authoritative bodies and the parties continue to disagree.
The institutions of accountability
Several international institutions are engaged with the conflict, and it is important to understand that they answer different questions and have different powers. They are frequently conflated in public debate, but their roles do not overlap.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) resolves disputes between states and issues advisory opinions; it does not try individuals. South Africa has brought proceedings against Israel under the Genocide Convention, and the Court has issued provisional measures; Israel rejects the allegation of genocide and contends its operations are lawful self-defence against Hamas. Provisional measures are binding but, many lawyers stress, are not a finding that genocide has occurred — that question remains for a later merits stage that may take years. The International Criminal Court (ICC), by contrast, prosecutes individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Its Prosecutor has sought arrest warrants in connection with the conflict, including against Israeli and Hamas figures; the relevant parties have challenged the Court's jurisdiction and the warrants themselves. Universal jurisdiction allows certain national courts to prosecute the gravest international crimes regardless of where they occurred, though in practice its exercise is constrained by political, evidentiary and immunity considerations.
What these institutions cannot do is as significant as what they can. None commands its own police force; enforcement depends on states. ICJ judgments bind only the states before it, and compliance ultimately rests on political will and the Security Council, where the veto looms large. ICC warrants require member states to act on them. As a result, many observers note a persistent gap between legal pronouncement and practical enforcement — a gap critics describe as impunity and which defenders of the accused describe as the proper limits of contested jurisdiction.
These questions are genuinely unresolved or contested, and are framed here without prejudging the answer:
- How should proportionality be assessed — attack by attack on the evidence available to the commander, or by reference to aggregate patterns of harm?
- What is the legal status of Gaza and the West Bank, and does effective control persist during active hostilities?
- Where does lawful self-defence end and an unlawful response begin, and how do jus ad bellum and jus in bello interact here?
- What obligations govern humanitarian access, and when do restrictions cross into collective punishment?
- How far do the ICC's jurisdiction and any immunities extend over the individuals named, and will warrants be enforced?
- What weight should be given to contested casualty figures compiled by different bodies using different methods?
The wider regional dimension
The conflict has never been confined to Gaza, and its regional spillover raises further questions of international law. Exchanges of fire across the Israel–Lebanon border involving Hezbollah, periods of direct hostilities between Israel and Iran, and attacks on Red Sea shipping attributed to the Houthi movement in Yemen each implicate distinct legal regimes — the law governing the resort to force between states, the law of naval warfare and freedom of navigation, and the rules on state responsibility for the conduct of non-state armed groups.
Each party frames these episodes differently. Iran and the groups aligned with it describe their actions as support for the Palestinians or as responses to attacks on their own personnel and territory; Israel describes them as aggression by an Iran-led network that it is entitled to counter in self-defence. The targeting of commercial vessels in the Red Sea has drawn objections from a wide range of states on the basis that freedom of navigation is a shared interest protected by international law, while those conducting the attacks justify them by reference to the conflict in Gaza. International lawyers debate when one state may be held responsible for the acts of an armed group it supports, and when a response across borders is a lawful exercise of self-defence rather than an unlawful escalation — questions on which, again, the law is contested and the facts disputed.
The broader point is that escalation multiplies the bodies of law in play and the number of actors whose conduct may be scrutinised. A regional war is not only more dangerous; it is also legally more complex, drawing in the rules on sovereignty, neutrality, and the protection of civilians and infrastructure far beyond Gaza itself.
- International humanitarian law binds all parties to a conflict and turns on principles — distinction, proportionality, precautions, the ban on collective punishment, and humanitarian access — whose application to disputed facts is genuinely contested.
- The legal status of Gaza and the West Bank, and the reach of the law of occupation, remain matters of authoritative disagreement between the parties and international bodies.
- The ICJ, the ICC and universal jurisdiction answer different questions and have different, limited powers; provisional measures and arrest warrants are not final findings of guilt.
- Enforcement depends on states, leaving a gap between legal pronouncement and practical effect that observers characterise in opposing ways.
- Regional escalation involving Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis layers further bodies of law over an already contested picture.
How Crejj & Partners can help
Our international and public law commentary is intended to help clients and readers make sense of a fast-moving and heavily disputed landscape — not to advance any party's case. For businesses and individuals operating in or around the region, we offer measured advisory work on cross-border legal exposure and sanctions compliance, helping clients understand how shifting designations, trade restrictions and reputational considerations may affect their operations. Where a matter touches on questions of international law, we can provide neutral analysis of the applicable framework and, where appropriate, refer clients to specialist counsel. Our role is to explain the law clearly and to help you navigate it, whatever your own view of the underlying conflict.
This article is provided for general information and analysis only. It is not legal advice, does not constitute political endorsement of any party, and does not create a solicitor–client relationship. The conflict it discusses is the subject of intense dispute; descriptions reflect publicly reported information as of mid-2026 and may since have changed. Crejj & Partners is a fictional firm presented for illustrative purposes on this website.