Stretching across the widest part of Africa is a semi-arid belt of land where, in the space of a few years, a run of military takeovers has toppled elected and transitional governments alike. Commentators now speak of an African "coup belt" — a phrase that captures a pattern without explaining it. Behind the headlines lies a tangle of insurgency, displacement, foreign rivalry and contested governance that deserves careful, dispassionate attention.
The Sahel is not a single country or crisis but a region under strain, and the forces at work there are widely debated. What follows is an attempt to set out the principal dynamics as they have been publicly reported, attributing contested claims and avoiding judgement on the legitimacy of any government or movement. The aim is understanding, not endorsement.
For readers in London and beyond, the Sahel can seem remote. Yet its instability touches questions of humanitarian law, sanctions, sovereignty, migration and resource security that reach well beyond the region itself. Mapping those connections is the purpose of this briefing.
What and where the Sahel is
The Sahel is the transitional zone south of the Sahara desert and north of the wetter savannahs of sub-Saharan Africa — a band running roughly from the Atlantic coast of Mauritania and Senegal eastward through Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. The word derives from an Arabic term for "shore" or "coast," the idea being that the region is the shoreline of a sea of sand. It is among the poorest and most environmentally fragile parts of the world, with rapidly growing populations and limited state reach into rural areas.
The label "coup belt" arose because, since 2020, the region has seen an unusual concentration of military takeovers. Mali experienced coups in 2020 and 2021; Burkina Faso saw two in 2022; Niger's elected president was detained and removed in 2023; and Guinea, on the West African coast, underwent a coup in 2021. Chad followed a different path, with a military council installing the late president's son after his death in 2021 — a transition many observers characterised as dynastic rather than a classic coup, though accounts differ. Taken together, these events have placed a contiguous run of states under military-led rule.
Explanations for the pattern are contested. Some emphasise failures of governance, corruption and the inability of civilian administrations to provide security; others point to the legacy of colonial borders, economic marginalisation, or the spread of armed groups. No single cause is sufficient, and reasonable analysts weight these factors differently.
The insurgencies driving insecurity
A central driver of the region's turmoil is a constellation of armed jihadist movements that have spread across the central Sahel over more than a decade. Two broad affiliations are most often cited: groups linked to al-Qaeda, operating under a coalition usually known by its Arabic acronym JNIM, and groups affiliated with the Islamic State, frequently referred to as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara. These movements are not monolithic; they compete with one another as well as with state forces, and their relationships with local communities are complex and shifting.
The human consequences have been severe by most reputable accounts. Monitoring organisations have reported that the central Sahel became one of the deadliest regions in the world for conflict-related violence, with large numbers of civilians killed and millions displaced. The United Nations and humanitarian agencies have repeatedly warned of acute food insecurity affecting many millions across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, driven by a combination of conflict, displacement, climatic stress and disrupted trade. Precise figures vary between sources and over time, and should be treated as estimates rather than settled fact.
The Sahel illustrates how insecurity, displacement and hunger reinforce one another: violence empties farmland, displacement strains host communities, and scarcity in turn fuels grievance. Disentangling cause from consequence is one of the central analytical challenges of the region.
Allegations of abuses have been directed at multiple parties — armed groups, national armies and foreign forces alike. Human rights organisations have documented incidents attributed to several actors, and many of these claims are disputed by the governments concerned. A neutral reading acknowledges both the documentation and the disputes without presuming the outcome of investigations that have not concluded.
A geopolitical realignment
Perhaps the most striking development has been a reordering of the region's external partnerships. For years, France — the former colonial power in much of the Sahel — led counter-insurgency operations, most prominently a mission known as Operation Barkhane, alongside United Nations peacekeeping and various Western and regional contributions. Following the recent coups, several of the new military authorities asked French and some other Western forces to leave, and those deployments were wound down. The reasons offered, and the wisdom of the departures, remain matters of sharp debate.
Into this shifting landscape have come Russian private military contractors. Reporting has linked the Wagner Group, and a successor structure often described as Africa Corps and associated with the Russian state, to security arrangements in several Sahelian states. Supporters present these partnerships as sovereign choices to secure outside help on different terms; critics allege abuses and warn of dependency. The precise command relationships and conduct of these contractors are contested and difficult to verify independently.
Regionally, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States (often referenced by its French acronym, AES) as a mutual-defence and cooperation grouping, and subsequently announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, the long-standing regional bloc. ECOWAS had condemned the coups and, in some instances, imposed sanctions and threatened intervention. The split is widely seen as a significant rupture in West African regional architecture, though its durability and consequences are not yet clear.
Resources, migration and global stakes
The Sahel's strategic significance rests partly on what lies beneath it and partly on its position. The region holds notable mineral wealth: Mali and Burkina Faso are among Africa's significant gold producers, and Niger has historically been an important source of uranium, some of which has supplied European nuclear power. Control over mining revenues, and the terms on which foreign companies and security providers operate, are themselves points of contention within and between states.
The region also sits astride established migration routes. People displaced or impoverished by conflict may move within the Sahel, toward North Africa, and in some cases onward toward Europe across the Mediterranean. European governments have accordingly treated Sahelian stability as connected to their own migration and security concerns — a framing that some in the region regard as self-interested. The interplay between development, security and migration policy is complex and politically charged.
Beyond the immediate human cost, several threads tie the region to wider global questions:
- It is a frontline of one of the world's most active jihadist insurgencies, with implications for regional and international security.
- It has become an arena for great-power competition, as Western forces depart and Russian contractors expand their footprint.
- It supplies gold and uranium to global markets, including European energy supply chains.
- It lies on migration routes that connect West Africa to North Africa and, for some, onward to Europe.
- Its institutional rupture with ECOWAS raises questions about the future of African regional cooperation.
None of these factors should be read as a prediction. The Sahel's trajectory is genuinely uncertain, and confident forecasts — of either consolidation or collapse — have repeatedly been confounded. What can be said is that the region's problems are unlikely to remain contained within its borders.
- The "coup belt" describes a run of military takeovers since 2020 across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea and Chad — a pattern with contested causes rather than a single explanation.
- Jihadist insurgencies affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have driven severe insecurity, mass displacement and acute food insecurity, though figures vary by source.
- A geopolitical realignment has seen French and some Western forces withdraw while Russian contractors linked to Wagner and Africa Corps have expanded their role.
- Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States and announced withdrawal from ECOWAS, marking a notable regional rupture.
- Gold, uranium and migration routes give the Sahel global significance well beyond its own borders.
How Crejj & Partners can help
Our International Law & Global Affairs team advises clients whose interests intersect with unstable regions such as the Sahel. That work spans cross-border risk assessment, sanctions and export-control compliance, the navigation of contractual relationships affected by political upheaval, and considered commentary on the legal dimensions of conflict — from humanitarian law to questions of sovereignty and accountability. We do not take political sides; our role is to help clients understand the legal landscape clearly and act prudently within it. If your organisation operates in, sources from, or is otherwise exposed to the region, we are glad to discuss how we can assist.
This article is provided for general information and analysis only. It is not legal advice, does not constitute political endorsement of any party, and does not create a solicitor–client relationship. Descriptions reflect publicly reported information as of mid-2026 and may since have changed. Crejj & Partners is a fictional firm presented for illustrative purposes on this website.